Slow Down

Continuing with the discussion of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking Fast andSlow, I noted that the author’s construct of a brain separated into a fast, associative processor (System 1) informing but, occasionally, overridden by a powerful but lazy slow processor (System 2) helps explain a number of observable phenomena such as our susceptibility to visual and cognitive illusions.

This model can also help us understand pan-human tendencies towards certain types of cognitive biases, notably confirmation bias which makes us readily accept information that already conforms to our beliefs, but treats information that contradicts or confounds those beliefs with suspicion.  After all, if our fast associative System 1 uses stories to categorize and understand information coming at us from all directions, what makes more sense than to create a story that plays up our preferences and plays down or rejects our dislikes? 

Making room in our mind for uncomfortable facts takes effort, often involving looking at the world outside the framework of an easy-to-understand storyline and delving into uncertainties (or probabilities) which bring us into the realm of System 2.  Our slow processor does this work well, but engaging this lazy workhorse requires effort.  And if we can get along just fine believing a comfortable story about, say, our preferred presidential candidate representing all goodness and truth (while his opponent is a dishonest cad), why not simply accept fast System 1’s take on the matter and let slow System 2 enjoy the day off?

Kahneman’s discussion of psychology and behavioral economics can also inform other challenges that come into play during a presidential campaign, such as anchoring and framing. 

Anchoring involves putting out some information (usually numeric) that our mind automatically makes the starting point for further thinking about an issue.  An example the author uses is that if I ask a group of people if Gandhi was 140 years old when he died, all of them will, of course, answer no.  But if I then ask him how old they think he was when he died, they will tend to pick a significantly higher number than a group who was first asked an equally ridiculous anchoring question of whether the Indian leader died at age 9. 

Anchoring is a powerful phenomenon which takes advantage of a System 1 that grabs the first information it receives and uses it to build out a story that is harder to edit or delete than to create.  And thus we stick to first impressions, even if those first impressions are wrong or were purposefully implanted in the conversation to anchor us.  This is why politicians and advertisers (whether communicating employment statistics or quantitative health information regarding food products) want to get their numbers entered into the conversation early, so that subsequent conversations will stay anchored where they prefer.

Fast and Slow also draws attention to our dramatic preference for frames of reference that highlight gains vs. losses.  For example, many people who would buy a five dollar lottery ticket for a 1:10 chance to win $100 would refuse a bet that offered them a 10% chance of winning $100 but a 90% chance of losing $5.  Even though the two bets are nearly identical in economic terms (actually, once you do the math the second is better than the first), in psychological terms the notion of paying $5 for a lottery ticket is treated far more positively than losing $5 as the outcome of a failed bet.

Keep this in mind during the campaign season when candidates explain that they want to help you keep four-fifths of you money (rather than tax you at 20%) or perform what you suspect might represent some mathematical slight of hand.  In fact, whenever you are confronted by statistical data (from political friend or foe), it might make sense to stop what you’re doing, spend five minutes doing multiplication of various two-digit numbers in your head (which tends to engage System 2), and then come back issue afresh.

While I suspect that follow up to the work of Kahnaman and the researchers which followed him will help us further understand other political phenomena (such as our preference for certain cadences and word choice reflected in the rules of rhetoric), I started to get uncomfortable with his final conclusions regarding how his discoveries could be applied in the real world – the subject of some final thoughts next time.